Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers

4-19-2013

Heterogeneous Beliefs, Regret, and Uncertainty:
The Role of Speculation in Energy Price Dynamics
Marc Joëts
Ipag Business School and EconomiX-CNRS, University of Paris Ouest, France, marc.joets@u-paris10.fr

Follow this and additional works at: http://services.bepress.com/feem
Recommended Citation
Joëts, Marc, "Heterogeneous Beliefs, Regret, and Uncertainty: The Role of Speculation in Energy Price Dynamics" (April 19, 2013).
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers. Paper 783.
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper783

This working paper site is hosted by bepress. Copyright © 2013 by the author(s).

Joëts: Heterogeneous Beliefs, Regret, and Uncertainty: The Role of

Heterogeneous beliefs, regret, and uncertainty:
The role of speculation in energy price dynamics
Marc Joëtsy
February 15, 2013

Abstract
This paper proposes to investigate the impact of …nancialization on
energy markets (oil, gas, coal and electricity European forward prices)
during both normal times and extreme ‡uctuation periods through an
original behavioral and emotional approach. To this aim, we propose
a new theoretical and empirical framework based on a heterogeneous
agents model in which fundamentalists and chartists co-exist and are
subject to regret and uncertainty. We …nd signi…cant evidence that
energy markets are composed by heterogeneous traders which behave
di¤erently depending on the intensity of the price ‡uctuations and uncertainty context. In particular, energy prices are mainly governed by
fundamental and chartist neutral agents during normal times whereas
they face to irrational chartist averse investors during extreme ‡uctuations periods. In this context, the recent energy prices surge can be
viewed as the consequence of irrational exhuberance. Our new theoretical model outperforms the random walk in out-of-sample predictive
ability.
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Introduction

The recent and unprecedented surge observed in energy prices, and especially in crude oil price, from 2003 to 2008 has given rise to hot public and
academic debates about the true nature of these shocks. Due to the potential impact of these huge movements on most economies (Sadorsky, 1999;
Hamilton, 2003; Edelstein and Kilian, 2007; Kilian, 2008, among others),
the e¤ectiveness of economic policies strongly depends on the identi…cation
of the major causes of energy prices movements. Since Greenspan (2004)’s
intervention about the existence of speculators in oil market, a popular view
about the origins of price surge is that these movements cannot be attributed
to economic fundamentals (such as changes in supply and demand conditions), but are caused by the increasing …nancialization of commodities.
This …nancialization should in turn cause volatility clustering phenomena,
extreme movements, higher comovements between oil, …nancial assets, and
commodity prices, as well as increased impact of …nancial investors decisions (such as hedge funds, swap dealers, ...). The question of the in‡uence
of …nancial investors on energy prices is of primary importance from both
economic and political points of view. Economically, the role of speculation in energy markets raises the question of the trade-o¤ between private
and public interests, since …nancialization is often de…ned as being bene…cal
from private perspective without any bene…cal considerations from a social
planner’s point of view. Politically, the debate is even more relevant since
it brings credibility about regulation of commodity derivatives markets in
the same way that the G20 governments try to regulate …nancial markets
by limiting speculative behaviors.1
Therefore, there has been a renewal of interest in the academic literature for this topic, even if no clear cut conclusion has emerged. Indeed, the
question about the role of speculation in commodity markets is not trivial;
identifying and quantifying this phenomenon being a di¢ cult task because
trader positions are relatively opaque. As we will see in Section 2, some
studies de…ne the phenomenon as the consequence of increased comovements
between markets, while some others consider markets as composed by di¤erent shocks which a¤ect price dynamics. However, these approaches mainly
focus on the oil market without considering other energy prices, whereas the
same movements occur in these markets. More importantly, they assume
that the market is e¢ cient in the sense that investors are rational and representative, and the oil price fully re‡ects all the available information. Oil
1
In 2010, the U.S government has initiated the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act on commodity markets to limit speculative behaviors by mandatoring centralized clearing of OTC standard contracts and automation of the Securities
and Exchange Commission.
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market e¢ ciency was however rejected by GjØlberg (1985), and Moosa and
Al-Loughani (1994). Moreover, according to Kirman (1992), aggregation
arguments under rational behaviors are insu¢ cient to reduce markets to a
single representative agent. Indeed, following Townsend (1983) and Singleton (1987) it seems reasonable to consider heterogeneous expectations, and
it appears optimal for each agent to forecast the forecasts of others. Fundamentals are important but a variety of di¤erent models may be relevant to
explain behaviors in energy markets. The purpose of this paper is precisely
to bring new theoretical elements to understand who and what drive the
markets.
Another important limitation in the existing literature is that it has been
based on an analysis of risk as opposed to uncertainty.2 Therefore, previous
studies suppose that agents have no considerations about uncertainty on
their models, their priors or the future evolution of prices, although allowing
uncertainty could be relevant to account for some "anomalies" and stylised
facts of markets.
Previous analyses thus evolve in a constrained world where agents are rational and where uncertainty does not exist. To deal with these limits we propose a new theoretical and empirical framework to investigate what drives
energy price ‡uctuations. Our theoretical model overcomes the restrictive
assumption of rationality by considering that heterogeneous expectations
could be the cause of recent prices movements. We propose to extend the
traditional heterogeneous agent model (HAM) of Brock and Hommes (1997,
1998) in the same way as Kozhan and Salmon (2009) to account for uncertainty in the markets. We therefore assume that investors are faced with
forming energy price expectations and consider the worst outcome within
the set of di¤erent models in some interval, where the size of interval is a
subjective choice of agents allowing to capture di¤erent degrees of uncertainty aversion. In traditional HAM, agents are supposed to switch between
di¤erent strategies characterizing heterogeneous speci…cations according to
a cognitive learning process. We propose to extend this rule to a more realistic one which accounts for both cognitive and emotional dimensions by a
regret criterion à la Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982).3
We also estimate our model empirically using nonlinear least squares (NLS)
methods to investigate whether heterogeneous expectations and uncertainty
exist in the markets and can lead to strong ‡uctuations of energy prices.
Estimations are done during both normal times and extreme movements
periods4 in order to see if the behavior of prices can be di¤erent depending
2

By risk we consider that agents know the probability distribution of a random variable,
as opposed to uncertainty when agents have no knowledge about it.
3
According to the seminal work of Damasio (1994), emotion can also a¤ect behavior
and play a crucial role in the decision process, where lack of feelings leads to suboptimal
choices.
4
Normal times are approximated by price movements in the mean of the distribution,
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on the intensity of the markets.5 The theoretical model is then compared to
a random walk (RW) in terms of predictive ability. To our best knowledge,
investigating the relative impact of …nancialization on energy price ‡uctuations through behavioral and emotional aspects under uncertainty during
normal and extreme situations has never been done before.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a literature
review on the role of speculation on energy markets. Section 3 describes our
theoretical framework, and Section 4 outlines speci…cation and estimation
procedure of the model. Section 5 contains in-sample and out-of-sample
estimation results, and Section 6 concludes the paper.

2

The role of speculation on energy markets: what
have we learned so far?

This section reviews the literature related to the impact of speculation on
energy markets, and more speci…cally on oil future prices.6 We discuss the
relative conceptualization of "commodity speculation" and how it can impact prices dynamics. We identify four strands in this literature. One strand
links the participation of …nancial investors in oil markets to the evidence of
increased comovements between oil, commodity, and stock prices. Another
strand looks at the causal relationship between the position taken by index
fund managers and oil prices. The third approach considers structural VAR
models to investigate the impact of speculation. Finally, the fourth approach
assumes that the existence of heterogeneous traders in the markets, namely
fundamentalists and chartists, can impact prices ‡uctuations.7
In this hot debate about the …nancialization of oil market, and more
generally of commodity markets, the key question is how to de…ning what
we call "commodity speculation". According to Kilian and Murphy (2013),
a general de…nition of speculation in oil market refers to a situation where
"anyone buying crude oil not for current consumption, but for future use".
Following this de…nition, speculative investors can have two options, buying
physical oil now and store it to accumulate oil inventories, or buying crude
oil futures contracts. Therefore, according to Alquist and Kilian (2010)’s
while extreme ‡uctuations periods are in the quantiles.
5
By intensity of the markets, we consider price movements during normal times and
extreme prices’‡uctuation periods.
6
This debate mainly focuses on the oil market due to its potential impact on the real
economy (see, Hooker, 1996; Rotember and Woodford, 1996; Hamilton, 2003, Sauter and
Awerbuch; 2003,...).
7
Unlike Fattouh et al. (2012), we do not talk about the relationship between oil future
and spot prices, as well as the role of time-varying risk premia in oil futures markets.
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analysis, speculation in one of these markets will be necessarily re‡ected in
speculation in other market. In this sense, speculation would not be economically "irrational" because it seems reasonable that oil producers, considered
as physical traders, will stock up on crude oil to smooth production of re…ned
products. Speculation would be essential to oil market to function because it
provides liquidity and assists price discovery process. However, speculation
in the public debate has a negative connotation because it is often viewed
as an excessive phenomenon. This excessive phenomenon would be the consequence of private interests, increasing prices movements and a¤ecting the
social welfare. Determining excessive speculative behaviors is a di¢ cult task
because they do not necessary come from the position taken by the traders.
Commercial traders generally act as hedgers to protect their physical interests, while noncommercials traders are often considered as speculators.
However, as documented by Büyüksahin and Harris (2011), we can have
situations where commercial investors have speculative position in the sense
that they take a stance on the commodity price without hedging it in the
futures market.

2.1

Comovements between commodity and …nancial prices

Since 2003, without explicit mention to …nancialization, there is clear
evidence of increased proportion of …nancial investors in oil futures markets
(see, Alquist and Kilian, 2010; Büyüksahin et al., 2009; Tang and Xiong,
2011; Hamilton and Wu, 2011, among others). The …rst strand of literature
on this topic focuses on comovements between commodity prices, mainly oil
prices, and stock markets, as well as volatility spillover e¤ects. Hammoudeh
et al. (2004), using cointegration techniques as well as ARCH-type speci…cations among …ve daily S&P oil sector stock indices and …ve daily oil prices for
the US oil markets from July 1995 to October 2001 …nd volatility spillover
e¤ects from the oil futures market to the stocks of some oil sectors. Chiou
and Lee (2009) focusing on the asymmetric e¤ects of WTI daily oil prices
on S&P 500 stock returns from January 1992 to November 2006, investigate
the structure changes in this dependency relationship. Using the Autoregressive Conditional Jump Intensity model with expected, unexpected and
negative unexpected oil price ‡uctuations, they …nd that high ‡uctuations
in oil prices have asymmetric unexpected e¤ects on stock returns. Filis et
al. (2011) analyze time-varying correlations between oil prices and stock
markets by di¤erentiating oil-importing (USA, Germany, and the Netherlands) and oil-exporting (Canada, Mexico, and Brazil) countries. They …nd
that the conditional variances of oil and stock prices do not di¤er for each
group. Büyüksahin et al. (2010), Silvennoinen and Thorp (2010), Choi and
Hammoudeh (2010), and Cretì et al. (2013) show that conditional correlations between commodity returns and stock index have increased recently,
5
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especially in periods of high volatility. Büyüksahin and Robe (2011) further
document that the increase in prices comovements is related to the entry
of hedge funds in both markets. Di¤erent general conclusions can emerge
from these studies. Indeed, some studies argue that increased comovements
between markets lead to decrease potential diversi…cation (Silvennoinen and
Thorp, 2010), while some others suggest that these comovements between
prices develop transmissions from a wide range of commodity and …nancial
markets (Tang and Xiong, 2011). However, this literature does not imply
that recent surge in commodity prices was caused by "commodity speculators". It could be due to many macroeconomic fundamental factors others
than …nancial speculation.

2.2

Index funds positions and commodity prices

Some other studies have focused on the question whether index funds
positions can create higher commodity returns. Master (2008, 2010), and
Singleton (2012), using highly aggregated Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) data on positions of index funds concluded that …nancial
investments a¤ect crude oil returns. However, Büyüksahin et al. (2009,
2010a,b, 2011a,b) show that to study the impact of speculation, heavily aggregated data are not suitable. Büyüksahin and Harris (2011) and Brunetti
et al. (2011) by considering speci…c categories of traders (such as hedge
funds and swap dealers) investigate the impact of positions in oil futures
prices and volatility. They …nd relevant causality from market conditions
to speculators, as well as the fact that speculators provide liquidity to the
market.

2.3

Structural models

A third strand of the literature is concerned with strucural economic
models of oil markets. Kilian and Murphy (2013) are among the …rst to
quantify the e¤ect of speculative demand shocks on the real price of oil. In
the same verge of Kilian (2009a,b), Kilian and Murphy (2012), and Baumeister and Peersman (2012), they use structural vector autoregressive (VAR)
models to disentangle demand and supply shocks in oil markets. They consider four strucural shocks: (i) an unanticipated disruption in the ‡ow of
supply of oil, (ii) an unanticipated increase in the ‡ow of the demand of oil
associated with an unexpected change in the business cycle, (iii) a positive
speculative demand shock, and (iv) residual oil demand shock.8 Using data
8

For more details see Kilian and Murphy (2012).
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back to 1973, the model …nds no evidence for speculation causing the price
surge, price changes being caused by fundamental characteristics, such as
supply and demand conditions. More recently, Juvenal and Petrella (2011),
and Lombardi and Van Robays (2011) propose to extend Kilian and Murphy’s model by introducting an additional shock (respectively speculation
by oil producers for the former, and ’nonfundamental’…nancial speculation
shock for the latter) and …nd evidence of …nancial speculation impact on oil
markets.

2.4

Heterogeneous agents and price ‡uctuations

All previously mentioned studies are based on the representative agent
paradigm and assume intuitively that agents in commodity markets are fully
rational. It appears that results about the impact of speculation regarding
the recent energy prices surge are not so clear. Some of them attest the existence of "commodity speculation", while some others reject this explanation.
Since the work of Simon (1957), the representative agent assumption seems
to be too restrictive, in the sense that there is only one way of behaving
rationally while there is an in…nite number of ways of behaving boundedly
rational. A possible cause of the large price volatility of commodity markets
could be therefore the existence of heterogeneous speculators in the markets.
Originally focusing on …nancial and exchange rate markets, this literature
turned to commodity markets to investigate potential anomalies in prices
‡uctuations. He and Westerho¤ (2005), Westerho¤ and Reitz (2005), Reitz
and Westerho¤ (2007), and Reitz and Slopek (2009), are among the …rst
to introduce models with heterogeneous agents for commodity markets and
…nd signi…cant evidence of trader heterogeneity and switching behavior in
prices ‡uctuations. More recently, Ellen and Zwinkels (2010) rely on the
HAM of Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998) to study the impact of heterogeneous traders in Brent and WTI crude oil prices. They …nd that oil prices
are mainly governed by fundamental factors (such as political and economic
issues, ....), but …nd also that speculators are present in the markets and usually have destabilizing e¤ects on the price of oil. These studies are mainly
concerned about spot prices where oil companies are pretty much the same.
More importantly, they cannot drive up the price without increasing inventories (unless the elasticity of demand is literally zero).

2.5

Extending the previous literature

The literature explaining the potential reasons of the recent commodity
prices surge does not go in the same way so that we do not really understand
7
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what cause these markets so volatile. It seems clear that the dynamics of
commodities, and especially of energy prices has increased signi…canlty since
2003, and it appears also relevant that the properties of these prices tend to
be close to those of traditional …nancial assets (such as volatility clustering,
autocorrelation, to name few (see Joëts, 2012)). What really cause these
speci…c behaviors?
Our paper proposes to investigate these speci…c characteristics by considering a less restrictive approach than previous methodologies. Because quantifying the problem of excessive speculation is not trivial, we do not really talk
about speculative phenomenon in its economic sense but rather try to understand if "irrational" expectations9 can cause abnomal ‡uctuations in the
markets. More formally, we propose to relax the rational agent paradigm
by considering a model with heterogeneous beliefs (Brock and Hommes,
1997 and 1998) where agents are allowed to switch between "rational and
irrational" behaviors according to an emotional regret process. Moreover,
we introduce a new circunstance where energy prices can experience strong
‡uctuations. Indeed as suggested by Knight (1921) and Keynes (1921), the
reason why the standard approach, based on expected utility theory, fails
to explain "abnomal" behaviors may be because agents in the markets may
face to uncertainty as opposed to risk.10 In our context investors may simply
face to uncertainty when they have no prior about their future energy prices
expectations. Uncertainty averse agents are therefore supposed to interact
with uncertainty neutral ones which can cause energy prices movements even
more important. The purpose of this paper is therefore to investigate theoretically and empirically the proportion of each trader in energy markets
(oil, gas, coal and electricity prices) during both normal times and extreme
‡uctuations periods to see whether the weight of irrational agents can exceed that of rational ones and leads to excessive energy prices movements
(i.e. which do not re‡ect fundamentals of each market).

3

Theoretical model

In this section, we develop a simple and stylized HAM that will be
used to evaluate the e¤ect of heterogeneous speculators on energy prices.
The model is based on the model introduced by Brock and Hommes (1997,
1998) and extended by of Kozhan and Salmon (2009). We propose a new
speci…cation of the HAM by integrating Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden
(1982)’s regret approaches where agents are allowed to switch between each
9

By irrational we think about naïve behaviors or noisy investors.
According to Bewley (2002), the distinction between risk and uncertainty is de…ned
by the fact that a random variable is risky if its probability distribution is known, and
uncertain if its distribution is unknown.
10

8
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strategy through an emotional learning process. More formally, there are
di¤erent types of agents in the market forming heterogeneous expectations
in uncertain universe which interact by a regret learning speci…cation.
The dynamic of prices can be expressed as follows:
(i)

pt =

(i)

+ Dt + " t

(1)

(i)

where pt denotes the dynamic of prices between t and t 1 of energy
(i)
i, with i being respectively oil, gas, coal or electricity prices. Dt is the
aggregate demand function at time t for each i, and "t is an error term
"t
(0; 2" ). The aggregate demand function is the consequence of the
disaggregate demands of each di¤erent type of traders.
In our economy, we assume that each agent can invest in both risk-free and
and risky assets. An agent wealth at time t is determined by his trading
activity and is equal to11

Wt = (1 + rt

1 )Wt 1

+ (Pt + yt

(1 + rt

1 )Pt 1 )dt 1

(2)

where Wt and Wt 1 are the wealths of each agent at time t and t 1, Pt
is the price (ex-dividend) of the risky asset at time t, yt is the dividend of
the risky asset, dt 1 is the demand for risky asset at t 1. rt is the risk-free
rate.
As in the traditional Brock and Hommes (1997)’s model, there are two
types of investors which interact in the market, namely fundamentalists
and chartists. The former group believes that there exists an equilibrium
price (the fundamental value) around which the price will always ‡uctuate.
Fundamentalists’ expectations of the energy price dynamics are therefore
proportional to the observed di¤erence between the fundamental value and
the price at t 1 according to the following equation
Et (Pt+1 =F ) = Pt

1

+

Pt

Pt

1

(3)

with 0
1. P t is the fundamental price of the energy market considered.
F denotes fundamentalist behavior at time t. Et denotes the conditional
expectation at time t.
In parallel, we assume that to predict future price evolution, chartist investors use a simple long-short moving average rule given by
11

For simplicity, we do not further report the exponent i for each series.

9
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Et (Pt+1 =C) = Pt

1

+

0

0

0

@ 1
M As

M
As
X
j=1

Pt

j

1
M Al

M
Al
X
j=1

Pt

1

jA

(4)

with
> 0, M As and M Al the respective lengths of the short and long
moving average windows. C denotes chartist behavior at time t. Et denotes
the conditional expectation at time t.
The fact that the market can be summarized by these two types of beliefs
is well established in the …nancial and exchange rate literatures (see, Taylor and Allen,1992; Cheung et al., 2004; Broswijk et al., 2007; de Jong et
al., 2010, to name few). Because energy markets can, depending on the
context, behave as traditional …nancial assets (see, Joëts, 2012), we assume
that these two traders’ types may also be present in these markets. Reitz
and Slopek (2009), Ellen and Zwinkels (2010), and Büyüksahin and Harris (2011), among others, have shown that in oil market, participants act
as "trend followers", where retroactive e¤ects in‡uence the positions taken
by stakeholders. In our model, the information available to both types of
traders at time t is the past level of prices, and past and present values of
fundamental variables. Following Brock and Hommes (1998), Boswijk et al.
(2007), and Kozhan and Salmon (2009), we assume for analytical tractability
that investors have homogeneous expectations about the conditional second
moment of price movements.12

3.1

Demand functions

Following Kozhan and Salmon (2009), we have four distincts individual
demand functions depending on the strategy used and the uncertainty context (i.e. uncertainty neutral/averse demand from fundamentalist/chartist
traders). In the sequel, we denote dut (B) and dnt (B) the individual demands
from uncertainty averse and neutral traders, with B = F; C.

3.1.1

Uncertainty neutral agents

In this case, we are in the situation where both fundamentalist and chartist
investors are considered to be neutral to uncertainty. In other words, they
are indi¤erent between their ignorance about an uncertain prospect or a
situation in which they have no prior experience. Their risk preferences
are characterized by a myopic mean-variance utility function, and agents
maximize their expected utility functions as follows
12

Et Pt2 =B = Et Pt2 , where B = F; C.

10
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n
n
Et U Wt+1
=B = Et Wt+1
=B

2

n
max
Vt Wt+1
=B !
n
dt

(5)

where U and V denote respectively utility and the conditional variance,
is the risk aversion parameter assumed to be the same across individuals.
The wealth of uncertainty neutral agent at t + 1 is given by
n
Wt+1
= (1 + rt ) Wtn + (Pt+1 + yt+1

(1 + rt ) Pt ) dnt

(6)

Maximizing the mean-variance expected utility with respect to dnt give us
the following expression13

dnt =

Et [(Pt+1 + yt+1
Vt [(Pt+1 + yt+1

(1 + rt ) Pt ) =B]
(1 + rt ) Pt ) =B]

(7)

Beliefs about future dividends are considered to be the same for all traders
types and to be equal to the true conditional expectation (Et (yt+1 =B) =
Et (yt+1 )). We also assume that in a special case, the dividend follows an i.i.d
process, such as Et (yt+1 ) = y.14 For analytical tractability, the conditional
variance is assumed to be equal and constant for all types of investors, so
Vt = 2 . The equation (7) can be simpli…ed as follows

dnt =

3.1.2

Et (Pt+1 =B) + y

(1 + rt ) Pt

2

(8)

Uncertainty averse agents

Because the assumption of neutral uncertainty appears to be too restrictive in our case, we allow the existence of uncertainty averse agents on
energy markets. Unlike neutral category, uncertainty averse agents are attentive to the misreading and potential unmeasurability of their models or
associated probability distributions. They maximize their maxmin myopic
mean-variance utility function of future wealth.15 As in Kozhan and Salmon
(2009), the preferences of uncertainty averse fundamentals/chartists are expressed by the set of possible expectations of future energy prices evolutions.
13

See Kozhan and Salmon (2009) for proof.
y being a constant term.
15
For more details see Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Garlappi et al. (2007).
14

11
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In turn, the set of di¤erent possibilities is determined by a symmetric bandwidth # around the base of uncertainty neutral expectations. Therefore, the
future energy prices movements expected by the uncertainty averse agents
are assumed to ‡uctuate in the interval = [Et (Pt+1 =B) #; Et (Pt+1 =B) + #].

u
u
Et U Wt+1
=B = minEt Wt+1
( )=B
2

2

u
max (9)
Vt Wt+1
( ) =B !
u
dt

where is the anticiped prices in the interval . The wealth of averse agents
at t + 1 is given by
u
Wt+1
( ) = (1 + rt ) Wtu ( ) + (Pt+1 + yt+1

(1 + rt ) Pt ) dut

(10)

When averse agents maximize their maxmin expected utilities with respect
to dut , they are able to determine three optimal demand functions according
to the interval , namely S(B), Smax (B), and Smin (B)

S(B) =

Et (Pt+1 =B)+y+(1+rt )Pt
2

Smax (B) =

(Et (Pt+1 =B)+#)+y+(1+rt )Pt

Smin (B) =

(Et (Pt+1 =B) #)+y+(1+rt )Pt

2

2

According to Kozhan and Salmon (2009), given the level of energy prices
Pt , the optimal strategy in for uncertainty averse investors is to keep dut
units of energy according to the following rules16
8
Smin (B) if Pt < Et (Pt+1 =B) #
>
>
>
<
0 if Et (Pt+1 =B) # < Pt < Et (Pt+1 =B) + #
dut =
>
>
>
: Smax (B) if Et (Pt+1 =B) + # < Pt
16

(11)

See Kozhan and Salmon (2009) for more details.
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3.2

Learning process through emotional regret interaction

In traditional HAMs, agents may change their strategies at every period of time (they choose to become fundamentalists or chartists). The
learning process is generally similar to case-based reasoning scenario, where
agents evaluate the market and choose their investment strategies based on
comparison of the cumulative past performances of each forecasting rule
(see Kirman, 1993; De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 2006; Kirman et al., 2007;
Boswijk et al., 2007; Kozhan and Salmon, 2009; Ellen and Zwinkels, 2010,
among others). However, these learning processes are cognitively oriented
while psychologic studies have shown that investors’decision processes are
the conjunction of both cognitive and emotional factors (see, Zajonc, 1980;
Schwarz, 1990; Damasio, 1994; Forgas, 1995; Isen, 2000; Loewenstein et al.,
2001, among others).17 To account for the potential impact of feelings in the
behavior of agents, we propose to introduce a learning emotional switching
process based on anticipated emotions, de…ned as emotions that are expected
to be experienced by investors given a certain outcome level. Intuitively, the
switching mechanism is based on the regret theory of Loomes and Sugden
(1982) and Bell (1982). More formally, at the beginning of period t, agents
anticipate the regret they could experienced if they have chosen the fundamental strategy rather than the other one. Agents are allowed to switch between di¤erent strategies (fundamental vs chartist), and also between their
reaction to uncertainty in the market (averse vs neutral) according to this
regret criterion. Regret appears to be a cognitively-based emotion of pain
and anger when agents observe that they took a bad decision in the past
and could have taken one with better outcome. In our case, agents will
experience regret when their investment (based for example on fundamental
strategy) yields, ex-post a lower performance than an obvious alternative
strategy (chartist strategy) they could haven chosen.18
Within this framework, suppose that t+1 (F; C) denotes the probability of
a trader to adopt fundamentalist behavior at time t + 1 by the following
multinomial logistic expression

t+1 (F; C) =

where

t+1 (F; C)

e
e

Htn (F;C)

Htn (F;C)

+e

Htn (C;F )

(12)

2< 0; 1 > denotes the fraction of fundamentalists in the

17

The impact of feelings in decision process has been widely con…rmed empirically in
stock market ‡uctuations (Saunders, 1993; Cao and Wei, 2002; Kamstra et al., 2000;
Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; Kamstra et al., 2003; Dowling and Lucey, 2005 and 2008),
and more recently in energy price dynamics (Joëts, 2012).
18
Contrary to disappointment, which is experienced when a negative outcome happens
relative to prior expectations, regret is strongly associated with a feeling of responsability
for the choice that has been made.
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market (i.e. the probability to become fundamentalist rather than chartist
at t + 1), such as t+1 (C; F ) = 1
t+1 (F; C), the fraction of chartists at
time t + 1. The parameter is the intensity of choice and represents the
matter to which the regret/rejoice feelings relative to a certain strategy at
t determine whether it is adopted at t + 1. More explicitly, measures the
extent to which investors hold their believe even though the other option
might be more attractive. Htn (F; C) and Htn (C; F ) are both based on the
following regret expression
Htn (F; C) = V n (F ) + f (V n (F )

E [V n (C)])

Htn (C; F ) = V n (C) + f (V n (C)

E [V n (F )])

with f (:) the regret function. V n (F ) is the utility of being F and not C , and
V n (C) is the utility of being C and not F . Each utility is discounted sums of
the one-period utilities of the respective uncertainty neutral fundamentalist
and chartist investors in the following general form

n

V (B) =

K
X

!k

1

U hnt

k+1 (B)

(13)

k=1

! being the discount factor, hnt (B) = (1+rt 1 )Wtn 1 (B)+(Pt + yt (1 + rt 1 ) Pt
Anticipation of V n (B), is expressed as E [V n (B)] = V n (B) + "t , with "t an
error term "t
0; 2" .

n
1 )dt 1 (B).

Our regret function is given by the following rule:
if V n (F ) > E [V n (C)] ) V n;F > 0, the group of fundamentalists
feels rejoice and the probability to become F at time t + 1 increases
(the same analysis holds for chartist group);
if V n (F ) < E [V n (C)] ) V n;F < 0, the group of fundamentalists
feels regret and the probability to become F at time t + 1 decreases
(the same analysis holds for chartist group).

Simultaneously, with the fundamental/chartist switching mechanism an agent
can also change his reaction according to the level of uncertainty present in
the market. Agent can be neutral to uncertainty if he considers the information available in the market as certain and has no doubt about his
model or potential prior. He will be more willing to choose the expected
14
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utility strategy. However, neutral agent is allowed to switch to uncertainty
averse behavior. As discussed by Kozhan and Salmon (2009), under severe
uncertainty about the condition and the future evolution of the market, the
agent will use maxmin strategy whereas under weak uncertainty he will earn
some positive utility and will be less sensitive to bad outcomes. In the same
manner, the probability to become uncertainty neutral is given by

t+1 (n; B)

e

=

0

e

0

Htn (B)

Htn (B)

+e

0

(14)

Htu (B)

Htu (B) is the regret expression of averse uncertainty agent with
Htu (F; C) = V u (C) + f (V u (F )

E [V u (C)])

Htu (C; F ) = V u (F ) + f (V u (C)

E [V u (F )])

and

V u (B) =

K
X

!k

1

U hut

k+1 (B)

(15)

k=1

where hut (B) = (1 + rt

3.3

u
1 )Wt 1 (B)

+ (Pt + yt

(1 + rt

u
1 ) Pt 1 )dt 1 (B).

The aggregate demand function

The aggregate demand function is characterized by the four disaggregate
demands of each trader. zt denotes the proportion of fundamentalists in
the market and (1 zt ) the proportion of chartists. Wt is the proportion
of uncertainty neutral investors while (1 Wt ) represents the proportion of
uncertainty averse agents. Finally N is the total of agents. The general
form of the aggregate demand function is
2

6
F F;n
Dt = N 6
4 zt W t d t + z t 1
|
{z

WtF dF;u
+ (1
t
} |

f undamentalist group

zt ) WtC dC;n
+ (1
t
{z

chartist group

3

7
7
zt ) WtC dC;u
t
5
}
(16)

Equation (16) is then inserted in the relation (1) to investigate the impact
of each category of investors on the dynamic of energy prices.
15
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4

Speci…cation and estimation

Due to the complex nonlinear speci…cation of the model, HAMs have
not often been estimated, but simulated. Boswijk et al. (2007), de Jong et
al. (2009), Reitz and Slopek (2009), and more recently Ellen and Zwinkels
(2010) are among the …rst to estimate HAMs with switching mechanism on
the S&P500, option market and oil market respectively. In our empirical
section, we consider daily data over the January 3, 2005 to December 31,
2010 period. The sample has the particularity to cover the strong dynamics
that we observed recently in energy market. In order to allow for both
fundamental and speculative pressures, we rely on European forward prices
at 1 month for oil, gas, coal and electricity markets. Energy prices are
quoted in US dollars per tonne of oil equivalent ($/toe) and are extracted
from the Platt’s Information Energy Agency.
As mentioned in Section 3, our model is characterized by the interaction
of fundamentalist and chartist agents. Therefore for the model to function, it is necessary to set a stabilizing group against a destabilizing one.
The fundamentalist group bases expectations around the fundamental value
P t . To compute the fundamental value of each energy market, we use the
moving average of each price over a period of 60 days.19 One might argue
that the moving average rule cannot constitute a true theoretical fundamental value. For instance, Reitz and Slopek (2009) generate the fundamental
value of oil price based on Chinese oil imports. However, as discussed by
Ellen and Zwinkels (2010), this type of fundamental value causes an informational advantage making this method inappropriate in practice. Moreover,
our moving average rule allows us to consider fundamentalists as somewhat
more broadly. The chartist agents, for their part, use a simple 1-50 moving
average rule. Figure 6 in Appendix depicts the energy prices and their respective fundamental values (in logarithm) and shows the relevance of our
fundamental prices.
Table 1 in Appendix reports descriptive statistics of energy price returns
and misalignment between prices and fundamentals. They reveal that kurtosis of each energy return series is largely above three, which means that
the distribution is peaked with fat tails indicating strong uncertainty on the
markets. The speci…c properties of electricity market (i.e. non-storablility,
inelasticity of the supply,...) cause thicker tails than other series. Skewness shows that oil, gas, and electricity returns are generally right skewed
while coal returns are left skewed. These con…rm our view of strong ‡uctuation in energy prices. Regarding the misalignment between prices and
19

Results are robust to the choice of the window length. They are available upon request
to the author.

16

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper783

16

Joëts: Heterogeneous Beliefs, Regret, and Uncertainty: The Role of

fundamental values, positive mean for oil and gas signi…es that prices are
generally overvalued, while negative mean for coal and electricity suggests
an undervaluation.
Our model, characterized by the general form of equation (1), is estimated
using NLS. As we mentioned, the proportion of each agent in the markets
follows a multinomial logistic rule. The optimal values for K in equations
(13) and (15) are determined by Akaike criterion.20

5

Empirical results

This section is devoted to test whether the di¤erent types of traders
we speci…ed are active in energy markets, and to determine their relative
weights in explaining price ‡uctuations. We also propose an out-of-sample
analysis to compare the predictive ability of our theoretical model against a
simple random walk.

5.1

In-sample analysis

In order to investigate whether heterogeneous beliefs, and especially uncertainty can dictate energy price dynamics, we propose to estimate di¤erent
speci…cations of our model (i.e. with and without ambiguity). Moreover, as
documented by Joëts (2012), the dynamic of energy prices can be considerably di¤erent depending on the intensity of the market.21 Therefore, we
also intend to estimate our model during extreme ‡uctuations periods to investigate whether investors’behaviors are more severe in this circumstance.
Our model is estimated for each energy market. Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 report
in-sample estimation results during normal times, respectively for oil, gas,
coal, and electricity markets. First regarding the neutral case (i.e without
uncertainty), fundamental traders only impact energy markets. Indeed, although there is a signi…cant switching phenomenon22 between fundamental
and chartist expectations, the role of "trend followers" appears to be irrelevant. In neutral restrictive case scenario, fundamental considerations,
such as changes in the supply and demand conditions (for example OPEC
decisions, re…ning capacity, humanitarian unrest, increasing energy demand
from Asian emerging countries,...), would drive future energy prices evolutions.
20

K = 6 for oil, K = 3 for gas, K = 3 for coal, and K = 2 for electricity.
Using a new test of Granger causality in risk Joëts (2012) …nds that interactions
between energy prices can be more intense during extreme periods.
22
The intensity of choice is positive and highly signi…cant for each market.
21
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Let us now turn to a less restrictive case by considering that uncertainty
can exist in the markets and can cause future price ‡uctuations even more
ambiguous for participants. In this context, the in‡uence of uncertainty in
decision-making process could create large gaps between prices and fundamental values leading non-commercial investors more motivated to enter into
the market. As we can see, neutral and averse fundamentalists coexist with
averse chartists for almost all prices, whereas averse fundamentalists appear
to be rationally bounded and more prone to switch toward chartist strategy. The switching mechanisms between fundamental/chartist and between
neutral/averse are signi…cant and positive indicating that a double change
of attitude exists. Fundamentalist and chartist traders are not sure about
their respective beliefs on the market so they perpetually switch between
strategies following "the way of largest number", making price movements
even more important, creating in turn more uncertainty. This market phenomenology tends to favor "trend followers" against fundamental traders.
Figure 1 reports the trader weights in mean for each market with respect
to their signi…cance impact. For each market, chartist agents seem to be
dominant. While this dominance is weak for the gas market, it is clearer
for other series. Indeed, considering that oil market is mainly composed
by fundamentalits and chartists neutral and uncertain traders, the role of
chartists’ behaviors is largely ascendant. Turning to the coal market, this
superiority is even more important, where fundamentalists uncertain agents
seem to prefer to switch to "trend followers" attitude than to keep the fundamental strategy. Regarding electricity prices, two types of traders are
mainly present in the market (i.e. fundamentalists and chartists uncertain).
As for the gas market, the preponderance of one group (chartists uncertain)
against another (fundamentalists) is not immoderate in this market. This
similarity between gas and electricity prices can be the consequence of existing input-output relations between both markets.23 The speci…c nature
of gas market compared to oil one can be attributed to the recent European
liberalization process making long-term gas contracts no longer indexed to
oil market, but to spot and futures prices.24 This fact leads gas prices submit to fundamental and …nancial pressures in almost the same proportion.
Moreover, unlike oil prices which are internationally organized through liquid markets, gas prices are regionally managed and less subjected to the
international macroeconomic uncertainty.

As previously mentioned, the dynamic of prices can be considerably different if we look at extreme price movements. We propose to investigate
the proportion of each traders during extreme ‡uctuations periods by using
23

Usually, the natural gas is used as an input to the electricity production process.
Unlike futures prices which are most prone to be in‡uenced by …nancial investors,
spot prices usually re‡ect market fundamentals.
24
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Figure 1: Trader weights in energy markets during normal times
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quantile regression approach.25 This method allows us to distinguish between extreme downward and upward movements. As before, we propose
restrictive and unrestrictive forms of our model (i.e. neutral and uncertain
speci…cations). Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9 report the estimation results of neutral
HAM for oil, gas, coal, and electricity markets respectively at both downside
and upside circumstances. The proportion of each agent is not constant in
the markets depending on the side of the distribution. Indeed, for all series, fundamentalists and chartists interact during downward extreme prices
‡uctuations, while during upward movements only fundamentalist behaviors
are determinant (except for oil where both agents coexist). In other words,
if we assume no uncertainty in the decision-making process, fundamental
considerations would be the main consequence of prices increase, while both
fundamental and speculative pressures would be that of prices decrease.
However, because no ambiguity is a restrictive assumption, we propose to
extend our analysis to the case of uncertainty to investigate whether averse
behaviors are more important during extreme movements rather than normal times.
Tables 10, 11, 12, and 13 show estimation results of uncertain HAM of oil,
gas, coal, and electricity prices respectively (downside and upside). We can
see that compared to normal times, the composition of each market has
changed signi…cantly. Energy markets movements are characterized by the
interaction of both neutral and averse agents, however the weight of averse
traders seems to be higher compared to normal times. As before, the proportion of each trader in markets is di¤erent depending on the side of the
distribution. Regarding the downside context, uncertainty causes chartists
behaviors to be more present in the market making prices decrease extremely
rapid through self-ful…lling prophecy. This phenomenon has been recently
observed empirically in energy markets. For instance, oil Brent price has
increased sharply between mid-2007 and mid-2008 to a level of almost $140
per barrel, and decreased to less than $40 per barrel at the end of 2008. With
less intensity, same movements have been observed on gas, coal and electricity markets showing potential herd behaviors in prices. Turning to the
upside context, unlike during normal periods, extreme upward movements
are not only characterized by fundamental expectations, but also by speculators probably not related to physical interests. Generally speaking, the
fundamental nature of energy prices seems to fade in bene…t to "irrational
exuberance" as the ‡uctuations become more intense.
Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5 show the traders weight in each market during extreme
downward and upward movements, and con…rm this fact. Indeed, during
extreme prices decrease, energy markets are clearly dominated by chartists
uncertain agents supporting our intuition about the fact that uncertainty
25

For simplicity we suppose that switching parameters are the same as those estimated
during normal times.
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increases and in turn leads to "cascading behaviors". During extreme prices
increase, oil and electricity markets are dominated by both fundamentalists and chartists uncertain in the same proportion, whereas the latter is
more important for coal market and less signi…cant for gas market. However, the di¤erence between each market appears to be less pronounced than
during normal times.26 This phenomenon can be explained by existing interconnections between energy prices which are exacerbated during extreme
‡uctuation periods by diversi…ed commodity index investors who have large
diversi…ed multi-asset investment strategies.

Figure 2: Trader weights in Oil market during extreme movements

5.2

Out-of-sample diagnostic

In this section, we investigate the forecasting ability of our HAM regret model against the RW model. Forecats are created using an expanding
window of observations. More precisely, both models are estimated from
January 3, 2005 to December 31, 2007, then out-of-sample estimations are
computed until December 31, 2010. The relative performance of the two
forecast alternatives is evaluated by using the conditional Giacomini-White
26
This …nding goes in the same way of Joëts (2012) about asymmetric behaviors of
energy markets during upside and downside movements.
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Figure 3: Trader weights in Gas market during extreme movements

Figure 4: Trader weights in Coal market during extreme movements

22

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper783

22

Joëts: Heterogeneous Beliefs, Regret, and Uncertainty: The Role of

Figure 5: Trader weights in Electricity market during extreme movements

(2006)’s approach. Giacomini and White (2006) propose a test of Conditional Predictive Ability which allows to compare the forecasting properties
of two models, given a general loss function.27 This test allows to directly
apprehend the e¤ect of estimation uncertainty on relative forecasting performance. Moreover, it considers a less restrictive framework than previous
methodologies since it permits a uni…ed treatment of nested and nonnested
models and also can accommodate more general estimation procedures in
the derivation of the forecasts. As discussed by Giacomini and White (2006)
in order to choose the best forecasting model, we use a two-step decision rule.
The …rst one allows us to see whether there is a di¤erent predicitive ability
between the two competing models, then the second step procedure lets us
to decide which model is the best.28 This methodology is applied to each
energy market to see whether HAM is the best model.
Table 14 reports results of the two-step test procedure for each energy market. The …rst step is characterized by the rejection of the null hypothesis
of equal performance meaning that both HAM and RW models are not
equally accurate on average. In other words, it means that one model necessary outperforms the other one in terms of predictive ability. The second
step of the Giacomini-White procedure reveals that for each energy prices,
the HAM outperforms the RW in terms of forecasting performance. Our
HAM is therefore more adequate to apprehend the energy prices dynamics,
renforcing the fact that heterogeneous beliefs, regret, and uncertainty could
27
This literature was initiated by Diebold and Mariano (1995), West (1996), McCracken
(2000), Corradi et al. (2001), and Chao et al. (2001), to name few.
28
For more details see Giacomini and White (2006).
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be the causes of high volatility of energy prices.

6

Conclusion

In this paper we provide an original behavioral and emotional analysis of
the impact of …nancialization on energy markets under uncertainty. For this
purpose we suppose that energy price ‡uctuations can be caused by heterogeneous expectations, as well as uncertainty in decision-making process.
Our stylized heterogeneous agent model allows investors to switch between
di¤erent strategies according to market circumstances.
Turning to the empirical analysis of oil, gas, coal and electricity markets
over the January 2005 to December 2010 period, our results indicate that
the proportion of each trader in the markets is di¤erent depending on the
degree of uncertainty considered, as well as the intensity of ‡uctuations.
Energy prices ‡uctuations are mainly governed by fundamentalist expectations when agents in the markets evolve under certain context, while both
fundamental and speculative behaviors are the source of prices movements
under uncertain world. We have also shown that trader weights could be
di¤erent if we look at extreme situations. The proportion of uncertainty
averse agents increases during extreme downward movements leading to situations where the fundamental nature of the markets fades in bene…t to
irrational ‡uctuations as "cascading behaviors". The conclusion is more
parsimonious regarding extreme upward movements since price increases
are the consequence of both fundamental and chartist traders. All in all,
our paper shows the limit of previous literature considering a too restrictive
framework. We see that if we extend the analytical framework, we could
have better perception and understanding of what drive energy markets.
Our model has obviously some limitations. Chartists have usually more
complex behavior than a simple trend follower speci…cation, and fundamentalist behavior could be also more sophisticated to account for the speci…c
nature of each energy market. Despite these limitations the model outperforms standard benchmarks, and provides a …rst step toward the analysis of
behavioral and emotional attitudes of energy investors facing uncertainty.
Further work should be done to give a concise de…nition of what we call
excessive "commodity speculation", as well as to explore more precisely if it
can be costly in terms of social welfare.
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Figure 6: Energy prices and fundamental values at 1 month (in logarithm)
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Oil
Mean
Std. Dev
Skewness
Kurtosis
Notes:

p
0:0004
0:023
0:144
8:92

Gas
p p
0:003
0:047
0:455
4:80

p
0:0001
0:047
2:029
19:31

p p
0:0001
0:099
0:127
3:94

Coal
p
p p
0:0003
0:0002
0:018
0:045
0:573
0:099
10:08
5:62

Electricity
p
p p
0:0006 0:0002
0:030
0:063
1:81
0:419
25:17
5:98

p denote price returns, and p p the price deviation from the
fundamental value of the energy considered.

Table 2: In-sample estimation results for oil market during normal times
Oil
neutral
0:0007
(0:99)

1
2
4
5

6:30E

06

(2:34)

uncertainty
0:0006
(0:85)

5:42E

06

( 2:27)

NA

9:49E

05

(1:76)

2:40E
(1:27)

NA

05

2:90E

05

( 1:01)

8:07E

05

(2:80)

Switching
1

0:139

0:140

2

NA

0:043

(6:89)

(12:32)
(13:29)

is for the constant term, denotes respectively the demand from
neutral fundamentalists, averse fundamentalists, neutral chartists, and
averse chartists, is the parameter for intenstity of choice. , ,
denotes
signi…cance at 1, 5, and 10% level respectively. Between parentheses
t-stats.
Notes:
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Table 3: In-sample estimation results for gas market during normal times
Gas
neutral
-0:0007

uncertainty
0:0003

( 0:58)

1

0:0001

2

NA

4

( 0:25)

4:47E

( 2:07)

0:0004
( 1:49)

2:85E
( 0:26)

05

0:0001
( 0:77)

NA

0:0003

1

0:150

0:076

2

NA

0:446

5

05

(2:29)

(1:98)

Switching
(10:14)

(11:92)
(12:14)

is for the constant term, denotes respectively the demand from
neutral fundamentalists, averse fundamentalists, neutral chartists, and
averse chartists, is the parameter for intenstity of choice. , ,
denotes
signi…cance at 1, 5, and 10% level respectively. Between parentheses
t-stats.
Notes:
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Table 4: In-sample estimation results for coal market during normal times
Coal
neutral
0:0004
(0:73)

1
2
4

1:68E

05

uncertainty
0:0003
(0:51)

2:24E

( 2:55)

NA
6:68E

05

( 1:74)

0:0003

(2:29)

05

0:0002

(1:13)

( 2:83)

NA

0:0001

1

0:472

1:06

2

NA

0:028

5

(4:51)

Switching
(9:05)

(4:29)

(12:13)

is for the constant term, denotes respectively the demand from
neutral fundamentalists, averse fundamentalists, neutral chartists, and
averse chartists, is the parameter for intenstity of choice. , ,
denotes
signi…cance at 1, 5, and 10% level respectively. Between parentheses
t-stats.
Notes:
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Table 5: In-sample estimation results for electricity market during normal
times
Electricity
neutral
0:0005
1
2
4

uncertainty
0:0003

( 0:58)

( 0:32)

0:0003

0:0002

( 2:00)

( 1:84)

NA
0:0004

NA
0:0001

(2:80)

( 0:34)

NA

0:0006

1

2:702

2:13

2

NA

0:090

5

(3:82)

Switching
(5:95)

(3:47)

(11:95)

is for the constant term, denotes respectively the demand from
neutral fundamentalists, averse fundamentalists, neutral chartists, and
averse chartists, is the parameter for intenstity of choice. , ,
denotes
signi…cance at 1, 5, and 10% level respectively. Between parentheses
t-stats.
Notes:
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Table 6: In-sample estimation results for oil market during extreme movements (without uncertainty)
Oil
neutral
Downside
= 5%
0:036

Upside
= 95%
0:033
(18:72)

( 16:07)
1
2
4

3:40E

05

2:78E

( 1:71)

NA
0:0002

NA
9:77E 05

(4:08)

( 1:77)

NA

5

05

(2:63)

NA

is for the constant term, denotes respectively the demand from
neutral fundamentalists, averse fundamentalists, neutral chartists, and
averse chartists. denotes quantile level, respectively 5% and 95% for
downside and upside. , ,
denotes signi…cance at 1, 5, and 10% level
respectively. Between parentheses t-stats.

Notes:

Table 7: In-sample estimation results for gas market during extreme movements (without uncertainty)
Gas
neutral
Downside
= 5%
0:059
1

( 16:50)

(18:89)

0:0001

0:0001

( 2:27)

( 2:40)

4

NA
0:0005

5

NA

2

Upside
= 95%
0:063

(1:80)

NA
2:70E

05

( 0:70)

NA

is for the constant term, denotes respectively the demand from
neutral fundamentalists, averse fundamentalists, neutral chartists, and
averse chartists. denotes quantile level, respectively 5% and 95% for
downside and upside. , ,
denotes signi…cance at 1, 5, and 10% level
respectively. Between parentheses t-stats.

Notes:
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Table 8: In-sample estimation results for coal market during extreme movements (without uncertainty)
Coal
neutral
Downside
= 5%
0:030
1
2
4
5

Upside
= 95%
0:027

( 12:98)

(18:60)

0:0002

4:06

( 2:51)

NA
0:0003
(5:52)

NA

(2:47)

NA
6:47E

05

( 0:99)

NA

is for the constant term, denotes respectively the demand from
neutral fundamentalists, averse fundamentalists, neutral chartists, and
averse chartists. denotes quantile level, respectively 5% and 95% for
downside and upside. , ,
denotes signi…cance at 1, 5, and 10% level
respectively. Between parentheses t-stats.

Notes:

Table 9: In-sample estimation results for electricity market during extreme
movements (without uncertainty)
Electricity
neutral
Downside
Upside
= 5%
= 95%
0:024
0:024
1
2
4
5

( 20:22)

(16:20)

0:0018

0:0026

(4:81)

NA
0:0019

( 8:52)

NA
0:0012

(11:32)

( 1:42)

NA

NA

is for the constant term, denotes respectively the demand from
neutral fundamentalists, averse fundamentalists, neutral chartists, and
averse chartists. denotes quantile level, respectively 5% and 95% for
downside and upside. , ,
denotes signi…cance at 1, 5, and 10% level
respectively. Between parentheses t-stats.

Notes:
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Table 10: In-sample estimation results for oil market during extreme movements (with uncertainty)
Oil
uncertainty
Downside
Upside
= 5%
= 95%
0:036
0:033
(21:40)

( 21:80)
1

8:12E
( 2:08)

2

0:0002

4

6:49E

5

05

2:68E

05

(2:55)

2:03E

(2:01)

05

( 0:14)

06

8:98E

05

( 0:09)

( 1:13)

0:0003

0:0001

(7:54)

( 2:22)

is for the constant term, denotes respectively the demand from
neutral fundamentalists, averse fundamentalists, neutral chartists, and
averse chartists. denotes quantile level, respectively 5% and 95% for
downside and upside. , ,
denotes signi…cance at 1, 5, and 10% level
respectively. Between parentheses t-stats.

Notes:
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Table 11: In-sample estimation results for gas market during extreme movements (with uncertainty)
Gas
uncertainty
Downside
Upside
= 5%
= 95%
0:061
0:063
( 17:17)
1
2
4
5

0:0002
(0:66)

(14:79)

9:73E

0:001

0:0004

( 2:20)

( 2:30)

0:0005
(1:08)

0:0007
(2:09)

05

( 2:20)

0:0009
( 0:77)

0:0002

( 2:29)

is for the constant term, denotes respectively the demand from
neutral fundamentalists, averse fundamentalists, neutral chartists, and
averse chartists. denotes quantile level, respectively 5% and 95% for
downside and upside. , ,
denotes signi…cance at 1, 5, and 10% level
respectively. Between parentheses t-stats.

Notes:
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Table 12: In-sample estimation results for coal market during extreme movements (with uncertainty)
Coal
uncertainty
Downside
Upside
= 5%
= 95%
0:033
0:027
( 10:75)
1
2
4
5

0:0002
(2:72)

0:001

(1:66)

0:0006
( 3:12)

0:0006
(4:77)

(17:84)

3:51E

05

(0:42)

0:0005
(8:81)

0:0006
( 0:40)

5:73E

05

(2:79)

is for the constant term, denotes respectively the demand from
neutral fundamentalists, averse fundamentalists, neutral chartists, and
averse chartists. denotes quantile level, respectively 5% and 95% for
downside and upside. , ,
denotes signi…cance at 1, 5, and 10% level
respectively. Between parentheses t-stats.

Notes:

Table 13: In-sample estimation results for electricity market during extreme
movements (with uncertainty)
Electricity
uncertainty
Downside
Upside
= 5%
= 95%
0:023
0:025
1
2
4
5

( 19:95)

(15:39)

0:0018

0:0026

(5:35)

NA
0:0013

(1:65)

0:0021
(11:17)

( 7:75)

NA
0:0010
( 1:20)

0:0011
( 2:58)

is for the constant term, denotes respectively the demand from
neutral fundamentalists, averse fundamentalists, neutral chartists, and
averse chartists. denotes quantile level, respectively 5% and 95% for
downside and upside. , ,
denotes signi…cance at 1, 5, and 10% level
respectively. Between parentheses t-stats.

Notes:
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Table 14: Conditional Predictive Ability Test
Model strategy
HAM model

Oil
200:83 (0:00 )
[0:70+ ]

RW
Gas
Coal
180:90 (0:00 ) 270:92 (0:00 )
[0:85+ ]

[0:98+ ]

Electricity
196:87 (0:00 )
[0:60+ ]

Notes: Between parentheses p-values. * denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at
1% signi…cance level. Between brackets the proportion of time the method in the
column outperforms the method in the row over the out-of-sample period,
according to the Giacomini and White (2006)’s decision rule. + indicates that

the HAM outperforms RW model more than 50% of the time.
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